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FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD 
STATEMENT 123 (R): THE EXPENSING OF OPTIONS 
Introduction 
By 
Daniel D. Acton* 
Robert G. Hutter* 
Mary Stermole* 
In the 1980's Nelson Pelz benefited greatly from 
Michael Milken' s junk bond fmancing. Pelz successfully 
bought and sold Triangle Industries. He then turned his 
attention to obtaining control of Triarc Companies, owner of 
Arby's, R.C. Cola and other brands. At the time of acquisition 
the market priced Triarc at $18 per share. Pelz immediately 
granted himself options on 600,000 shares at that price 
exercisable over the following decade. Under Pelz' s leadership 
the price of the stock dropped to half its former value leaving 
*Alfred University 
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Pelz's options under water. Pelz then announced that salary 
would be $1 per year but took an additional 75,000 opttons at 
the new price level. As the stock struggled along at the new 
price, Pelz took monthly options grants that eventually totaled 
almost three million shares. The stock eventually recovered a 
portion of its original price and Pelz was able to exercise his 
options and gain a seven million dollar personal profit'. Pelz 
had managed to reward himself well for what can be to 
at best as mediocre executive performance. Pelz's case ts only 
one of many that took place before the stock market crash of 
2000. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB) now 
requires that stock options be reported as an expense on the 
corporation's income statement. However, it is the authors' 
contention that this treatment is not theoretically sound. Stock 
options are, in fact, a redistribution of equity from existing 
shareholders to option recipients. The proper way to record 
these options would be similar to the method in which stock 
dividends are recorded, i.e. as a decrease in retained earnings 
and an increase in paid-in-capital. 
An option may be defined as the right (but not the 
obligation) to buy a set number of shares of stock at a specific, 
fixed price by a specific date in the future2• This is known as a 
call option. A put option gives the holder the right to sell a set 
number of shares of stock at a specific, fixed price by a specific 
date in the future3. Options have been used since the days of 
Benjamin Graham, mentor at Columbia University to Warren 
Buffett. Graham believed a grant of options would offer a 
small financial incentive to executives when good management 
performance was reflected in increased stock price. Most 
options grants in the earlier days resulted in an additional 
$10,000 to $15,000 to successful executives. 
By the 1980's the options landscape had changed 
considerably. Founders of high technology companies were 
usually short on funds to lure talent away from larger 
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companies such as IBM or Hewlett Packard. As an added 
incentive, new hires were given an ability to grow with the new 
companies through grants of options. Many young engineers 
and computer scientists became millionaires in a few short 
years through the exercise of these grants during the stock 
market increases of the 1980's and 1990's. CEO's, especially 
in Silicon Valley, were almost uniformly given tens of 
thousands of options grants annually. The companies were 
attempting to align the performance of the executives with the 
interests ofthe stockholders4 . Not surprisingly, accounting 
rules were often bent and stretched to maximize earnings and 
inflate stock prices. Even after the sharp decline in stock 
values after March 31 , 2000, Silicon Valley industries have 
remained the staunchest proponent of both options grants (even 
at lower re-pricing) and as against expensing their cost on the 
earnings reports. 
Accounting for Stock Options 
The October 1972 Accounting Principals Board Opinion 
No. 25 (APB 25) became the first accounting standard written 
specifically for stock options5. A measurement date concept 
determined the value of options. Using the intrinsic value 
method to calculate this amount, the "charge to earnings was 
equal to the excess of the fair market value of the stock at that 
date over the amount payable by the employee, if any", the 
amount being determined on the measurement date, or "the 
first date on which both the number of shares and the price to 
be paid ... are fixed"6 . But companies used fixed options to 
find ways around recording stock option expenses. This was 
accomplished by setting the exercise price equal to the fair 
market value on the date of grant. 
Two different forms of options, incentive stock options and 
nonqualified stock options, offer varying advantages and 
drawbacks. Incentive stock options are "qualified" stock 
options because they qualify to receive special tax treatment. 
The employee can defer income tax on the qualified options, 
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past the grant and exercise dates, to the date of sale. The . 
difference between the exercise (strike) price and the sale pnce 
is then taxed at the capital gains tax rate if the sale occurs after 
completion of the holding period.7 However, if the sale occurs 
before the completion of the holding period, the difference 
between the exercise price and the fair market value of the 
stock at the time of option exercise is taxed at the employee's 
ordinary income tax rate. Since the employee special 
tax treatment for the incentive option, the company IS not 
allowed to receive a tax deduction for the value of the option. 
Employers offering incentive stock options are able to attract 
and keep talented employees without the cash drain from 
paying higher salaries. . 
Several different conditions must be met for an optiOn 
to qualify as an incentive stock option. Section 422 of the 








Be granted to employees only; 
Be exercised by any employee during employment 
or prior to three months from termination of 
employment; 
Be for the issuing company, its parent company, or 
any of its subsidiaries. 
Be under a written plan, which must be approved by 
the stockholders within 12 months before or after 
plan adoption; 
Be granted within 10 years of the earlier of adoption 
or shareholder approval, and ... exercisable only 
within 10 years of grant; 
Be of equal or higher value than the fair market 
value of the underlying stock at the time of grant; 
Not be issued to any employee owning stock with 
greater than 10% of the voting power of all stock 
outstanding ... unless the option exercise price is at 
least 110% of the fair market value and the option is 
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not exercisable more than five years from the time 
of the grant; 
• Not be transferable by the option holder other than 
by will or by the laws of descent and that the option 
cannot be exercised by anyone other than the option 
holder; 
• Not have an aggregate fair market value exceeding 
$100,000 in a calendar year. 8 
Stock options that do not meet these conditions are 
nonqualified stock options. These options have little tax 
benefit for employees, but are tax deductible for the employer. 
As indicated above the employee must pay income tax on the 
spread between the grant price and the stock's market value 9 
on the date of exercise; this same amount can then be deducted 
from the employer's taxes. A distinct disadvantage of 
nonqualified stock options results from the employee having to 
report income even if, as he or she holds the stock, the market 
crashes and the stocks lose value. In this case the employee 
cannot offset the income previously reported. 
Since they did not have to worry about the expense 
associated with fixed options, companies disbursed large 
amounts of options to employees. Executives received nearly 
their entire compensation in the form of options. Executive 
had an incentive to increase the value of the stock within the 
vesting period in order to sell them at a later date. Since stock 
options were the basis of most accounting frauds during this 
period, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (F ASB) 
implemented Statement No. 123 10in order to influence 
employers to report the impact of options on the corporations ' 
financial statements. 
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FASB 123 
As early as 1984, the F ASB searched for ways to 
update APB 25 to fit the needs of the modem corporation and 
its investors. In 1995, they attempted to implement Statement 
123, which required companies to expense the value of all 
employee stock options granted. The value of the options was 
calculated using the Black-Scholes valuation method and then 
amortized ... over the expected period of benefit, which is 
usually the period from the date of the grant to the date of 
· II vestmg . 
The impact on the financial statements can be understood 
by an illustration. Assume 1,000 options are granted with a 
two-year vesting period, a $5 exercise price, and that the 
options are exercised in the third year after the grant when the 
market value of the stock is $16 per share. Assume also that 
the fair value of the options using the Black-Scholes model is 
$15 per share. The net impact on the income statement and the 
balance sheet after the three-year period will be a reduction in 
net income of$15,000-the fair value of the options, and an 
increase in paid-in capital of$20,000-the $16 per share market 
value at the date of the exercise plus $4 per share- the 
difference between the $15 fair value per share deducted from 
the difference between the $16 market value and the $5 cash 
received upon exercise 
The fall ofFASB 123s 
After the attempted implementation of Statement 123, 
the F ASB received harsh criticism from companies and 
members of Congress. The new regulation would greatly 
reduce earnings and high-tech executives, led by John Doerr, 
the venture capitalist. .. engineered a public rally to demonstrate 
the supposedly grassroots support for stock options.12 The 
outcry continued as members of Congress slowly began 
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pressuring the Board to change their position on stock options. 
Since the F ASB feared it would lose its private-sector, 
standards-setting authority, 13 they relented and made 
Statement 123 voluntary. Companies could comply with 
Statement 123 or use APB 25; however, with APB 25, 
companies still hade to make pro forma footnote disclosures 
stating what the financial statements (in particular, net income 
and earnings per share) would be using Statement 123 and how 
many options were unexercised. 
Legislative Attempts 
In order to further weaken the F ASB 's authority high 
tech companies lobbied members of Congress to bypass the 
F ASB by passing options legislation. The House of 
Representatives on July 20, 2004, passed HR-3574, the Stock 
Option Reform Bill by a vote of 312-111. 14 The legislation 
required expensing only the five largest individual option 
grants, presumably received by the top executives. Stock 
option grants to other employees were subject only to a 
footnote in the annual report. The bill further reduced the price 
volatility assumption underlying the "fair value" method of 
expensing option to zero, which meant that the price of any of 
the stock involved was not presumed to fluctuate. 
This bill was harshly criticized by the public at large. 
The most common complaint was that expensing some options 
and not others would give an even more distorted financial 
picture of the corporation. The Chairman of the Senate 
Banking Committee, Sen. Shelby of Alabama, voiced his 
immediate opposition to the House bill and the bill never made 
it out of committee in the Senate. 
The F ASB 's inability to require Statement 123 led to 
extensive debate between the supporters and opponents of 
expensing stock options. Slowly the Board gained the support 
of the investment industry which emboldened them to 
reconsider the statement. They issued Statement 123(R) which 
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required companies to expense stock options for reporting 
periods beginning after June 15, 2005. 
Effects ofF ASB 12 3 (R) . 
Corporations, and particularly high tech corporations, 
took several steps in anticipation of the new rule. Many 
accelerated the vesting period for option grants so they would 
not be expensed.15 Some corporations began to phase out stock 
options for new employees. Microsoft for example, . 
discontinued stock option grants and replaced them with 
outright grants of restricted stock. The use of option grants in 
hiring declined, which would suggest that now it is more 
difficult to hire new, talented employees. 
Ironically, grants to higher management have increased 
rather than decreased 16. This has become evident due to the 
visibility of options in quarterly financial statements.
17 
Expensing stock options reduces reported earnings and as a 
result, opponents expected the value of corporate stock to . 
decline. However, expensing stock options has not resulted m 
a decline in the stock market nor damaged the economy. To 
the contrary in the first quarter of 2006, the S & P 500 Index 
rose nearly five percent. 
Conclusion 
It is our position that employee stock options should not 
be reported as an expense on the corporate income statement. 
In support ofthis Statement of Financial Accounting 
5 states that "expenses and losses are generally recogmzed 
when an entity's economic benefits are used up in delivering or 
producing goods, rendering services, or other activities that 
constitute its ongoing major or central operations or when 
previously recognized assets are expected to provide reduced 
or no further benefits"18 • Utilizing this explanation, opponents 
of expensing argue that stock options do not fit under the 
requirements to be classified as an expense; they are not part of 
the operations of the company, not the main business activities 
that generate revenues or use assets. 
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Also, expenses are sometimes described as costs relating 
to transactions with third parties. Since the stock options in 
question are given to employees, technically the two parties 
involved are both part of the same entity. In this situation 
neither corporate assets nor corporate liabilities have changed, 
total equity remains unchanged ... but total equity has been 
redistributed 19• Expenses normally result in use of an asset or a 
creation of a liability. Stock options do not produce either of 
these results, and therefore should not be classified as 
expenses. An additional criticism is that expensing employee 
options results in an income statement equation which is 
inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles, i.e., 
Revenues - Expenses - Stock = Net Income. The normal 
equation is that Revenues - Expenses= Net Income. 
Stock options should be reported in the same way as stock 
dividends, i.e. as a redistribution of retained earnings. The 
impact on the financial statements can be understood using the 
same data as in our earlier example. Under our proposal, at the 
end of the third year after the option grant date, the income 
statement would be unchanged. Recall that under Statement 
123(R) net income was lower by $15,000. Under our proposal 
paid-in capital on the balance sheet would increase by $20,000 
and retained earnings would decrease by $15,000, the same as 
Statement 123 (R). The difference is that under our proposal 
the $15,000 reduction in retained earnings does not appear on 
the income statement as an expense; it is a direct reduction in 
retained earnings. The net income reflects the results of 
operations and not the redistribution of equity by means of a 
stock option. This provides a more representative income 
measure which better serves the investment community. 
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